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Abstract 
This study proposes and analyses the feasibility of a private sector ICR in 
which investments in human capital are accorded the tax treatment typi-
cal of fixed capital investments. Under this proposal, income-contingent 
repayment loans issued and administered by the private sector would 
cover both the full tuition costs and living expenses of students attending 
Postsecondary Education (PSE) institutions. The public sector would 
guarantee the loans, as well as provide relevant information to the pri-
vate sector lenders as required. 
Simulations suggest that the student and public sector shares in the 
proposed full fee and expense plan would be approximately the same as 
those under the current financing system with students' fees set at 50% of 
full tuition. The proposed plan promises to eliminate virtually all accessi-
bility problems related to financial constraints. Moreover, the incentive 
structures attendant to the proposed ICR are consistent with the "coherent 
learning system" advocated by the Economic Council of Canada. 
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Résumé 
Cette étude porte sur la faisabilité d'un plan de prêts avec remboursement 
à la source, déduit du revenu, dans lequel les investissements en capital 
humain recevraient le traitement propre aux taxations sur investissements 
à capital fixe. Selon ce plan, les prêts fournis et administrés par le secteur 
privé couvriraient les frais d'inscription ainsi que les frais d'hébergement 
d'étudiants inscrits à des institutions d'enseignement postsecondaire. Le 
secteur public garantirait les prêts et aurait la responsabilité de fournir les 
informations utiles aux prêteurs du secteur privé. La plausibilité de ce 
plan est examinée eu égard à la situation canadienne. Les simulations 
effectuées indiquent que le financement des étudiants et du secteur public 
pourraient être approximativement semblables au taux de répartition 
actuel si les frais d'enseignement se montaient à environ 50% de coûts 
totaux. Ce plan prometteur pourrait éliminer tous les problèmes d'accès 
associés au manque de ressources financières des étudiants potentiels. De 
plus , le sys tème d 'encouragement prévu s 'accorde au concept de 
cohérence du système d'apprentissage que recommande le Conseil 
économique du Canada. 
Introduction 
Income Contingent Repayment (ICR) plans have been discussed for 
decades and have been implemented in a number of countries.1 In 
Canada, an ICR was among the recommendations of the Macdonald 
Royal Commission (1985); a modest ICR plan for the Ministry of 
Ontario Universities was empirically investigated by Stager and Derkach 
(1992); and more recently, the Axworthy Green Paper (1994) discussed 
an ICR plan for Canada. For all that, the likelihood of a comprehensive 
Canadian ICR still seems remote. The Canada Social and Health 
Transfer appears to have limited program-oriented Federal initiatives in 
favour of block grants to provinces. Budgetary constraints in postsec-
ondary education (PSE) are being met by increased tuition fees and 
declining enrollment. It seems rather odd that, while there is general 
agreement that funding mechanisms must be changed (Maxwell, 1994), 
little seems to be changing. 
This paper proposes and analyses the feasibility of a private sector 
loan plan that includes an income contingent repayment scheme. The 
ICR loans would cover the full cost of tuition and living expenses which 
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represent the PSE investment in human capital. Loan repayments are 
treated as capital expenditures and are fully tax deductible. The ICR fea-
ture requires that the public sector guarantee PSE investment loans thus 
providing tangible security for the loans. The public sector is also 
assigned the role of information management in which private sector 
lenders are advised of the income and location of borrowers as required. 
This plan ensures financial accessibility for students, helps to ensure 
adequate funding for PSE institutions, and creates incentive structures 
directed toward enhancing the quality and efficiency of PSE services. 
In the next section we discuss the elements and rationale for a 
Private Income Contingent Repayment Plan (PP). The feasibility of the 
plan is evaluated using data from the Statistics Canada 1992 Survey of 
1990 Graduates as well as age/income data from the 1986 census. The 
third section discusses several issues important to the concept and design 
of an Income Contingent Repayment Plan, particularly as they apply to 
the proposed PP. The fourth section discusses incentive effects of the PP 
and its relationship to a more comprehensive view of PSE. The final sec-
tion summarizes the conclusions. 
Elements of a Private Income Contingent Plan 
An ICR and Human Capital 
An ICR plan is typically considered to consist of a source of funds estab-
lished by the government from which qualified students can obtain 
tuition loans. Repayment of a loan is based on the student's income after 
graduation and may be in the form of an additional tax. Repayment 
would be income contingent in that the additional tax rate (or repayment 
rate) would rise with income and there would be a minimum income 
below which no payments would be required. 
There are a number of benefits associated with such a plan. Perhaps 
the most important stems from such a plan's simplicity. Payments might 
be deducted at source according to some prescribed tax rate for an 
extended period, for example up to 25 years. Accessibility need not be 
constrained in any way by the financial status of the student. Such a pro-
gram promises considerable cost savings relative to the current student 
loan programs. In this proposal, interest accumulates on advances and 
collection and default costs are minimized since the individual is tracked 
through the tax system. Evaluation of student requirements is relatively 
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simple as they are based on tuition requirements plus a living allowance. 
Finally, fee increases, whether a result of an institutional policy change 
or a reduction in public sector subsidies, would not impede access if the 
ICR were sufficiently flexible to accommodate such changes. 
A major reason for the lack of action in PSE funding stems from the 
fact that there is considerable concern over the details of such plans. 
However, there are some basic economic features of PSE which underlie 
the recommendations for ICR plans: 
1. Expenditures on PSE are investments in capital, human capital. 
2. The intangibility of the asset produced by PSE precludes a 
broad market specializing in PSE capital. 
3. The lender in an ICR plan requires income information about 
the borrower. 
Human capital investment differs from physical capital investment. 
"To the extent that schooling increases the future earnings of the student, 
it has the attributes of an investment. But the human capital thus created 
cannot be sold as can nonhuman capital." (Shultz, 1963, p. 4) The key 
difference between human and physical capital stems from the intangi-
bility of the former. During the creation of human capital there is no 
physical chattel available that can be used as security to acquire financ-
ing, nor is there any easy way to estimate an intermediate value (work-
in-process). Moreover, the value of the human capital is, to a large 
extent, a function of the intellect and personality of the person in whom 
it resides. No extensive market currently exists for risk bearing during 
the creation of this highly intangible human capital, and, as a result, 
lending institutions are unable to estimate their potential losses. The 
income stream as a result of the investment in human capital does not 
begin until after some gestation period and is, in many cases, not a 
smooth or easily predictable path. 
These characteristics of investments in PSE all relate to capital mar-
ket problems. The problems associated with human capital investments 
have these implications which are central to the characteristics of an 
appropriate ICR plan: 
1. For tax purposes, PSE investment expenditures must be 
treated as deductions from income earned as a result of the 
investment. 
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2. The capital market for intangible human capital must be 
securitised. 
3. Operation of an ICR requires a mechanism which allows 
lenders truthful information about the income of the borrower. 
These characteristics are embedded in the proposal for a Private ICR 
Plan (PP) as outlined below. The PP differs fundamentally from other 
ICR proposals in clearly delineating the roles of the public and private 
sector which we detail in the next section. 
Structure of the plan 
Under a PP, financial institutions would provide the loans and their 
administration on an individualized basis. The government would guar-
antee the loans and register them with the tax authority to ensure compli-
ance (as is the case with many public sector ICR proposals). 
The loan program would be based on the following elements: 
1. Coverage of the full cost of tuition and a fixed amount for 
living expenses. 
2. PSE institution be permitted to set differentiated fees.2 
3. The financing of all loans through normal commercial chan-
nels and eligibility based solely on attendance at a PSE 
institution. 
4. An insurance component (provided by the public sector) to 
cover the costs of loan defaults and thus ensure a low inter-
est rate on student loans. An insurance component on the 
loans to cover death and disability which is the responsibil-
ity of the student. 
5. Repayment of loan geared to future incomes. 
6. Treatment of the loan (including all accrued interest and 
other financing charges) as an investment in (human) capi-
tal for the purposes of income tax. 
7. Provision to fall back on the income tax system to aid in 
collection of the loan if necessary. 
A number of arguments can be made in support of full cost of tuition 
schemes (Stager, 1989). Since the private benefits of PSE significantly 
exceed the private costs, it may be more equitable for the major beneficiaries 
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to bear a greater share of the costs. Others have noted that PSE primarily 
benefits the middle class while it is paid for primarily from public funds. 
The economic rationale for full cost fees is that the private benefits exceed 
the private costs even when full costs are considered. 
A central requirement of the PP is that human capital be recognized 
as capital in a meaningful way. As with investments in tangible capital, 
investment in human capital is a cost of earning income and is thus 
viewed as an appropriate deduction from that income for tax purposes. 
While the PP has similarities to other proposed ICR plans, details 
are important (Kesselman, 1993). We shall therefore discuss some 
details of the proposed PP in depth. 
Details 
Eligibility. Any student accepted into an accredited institution 
would be eligible for tuition loans covering all tuition costs (these might 
include course materials such as texts and laboratory items). Educational 
institutions have entrance criteria which serve, among other things, to 
decrease the probability that selected students will waste time and 
money. Should some institutions specialize in "marginal" cases or grant 
questionable qualifications, the accreditation of the institution might be 
questioned.3 
Limits could be imposed on the period of financing, for example, six 
years of undergraduate degree funding and three years graduate funding. 
We would argue against such restrictions since they could result in a bias 
against those who pursue degrees on a part-time basis or they might limit 
upgrading or changing of fields at some later point in the graduate's 
career. Indeed the very competitiveness of the world economy implies 
constant skill upgrading (Economic Council of Canada, 1992). 
An essential feature of the loan scheme is that students remain 
responsible for loan repayment even though repayments may be zero for 
some periods for which individuals may be out of the work force. The 
only escape is perpetual non-unemployment! This provides a strong dis-
incentive to wasteful behaviour. 
Financial accounting. The PP loans would be arranged though a pri-
vate financial institution chosen by the applicant.4 The student would also 
be responsible for death and disability insurance on the loan as is common 
with many consumer and mortgage loans. The financial institution would 
be responsible for registering the loan with the appropriate government 
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agency as well as for the normal accounting and administrative procedures 
applicable to private loans. The registration would allow the public sector 
to fulfill specific roles in the case of default of payments. 
Since all loans would be guaranteed, the rate of interest to be 
charged should be a rate close to that given to the institution's most 
trustworthy customers, typically at (or very near) the prime rate. The 
administration costs of educational loans may be less than other types of 
loans since limited financial checks are required in the issuance of edu-
cational loans. 
Except for those that are in default and which require government 
intervention, loans can be treated by both the graduate and the financial 
institution as any private loan. The sole difference lies in the calculation 
of the annual (monthly) payments. The lender would require an estimate 
of the gross annual income of the graduate to calculate the minimum (or 
maximum) required monthly payment. Any payments over the minimum 
could be appropriately applied to the principal of the outstanding loan. 
Defaults. Under the PP, both the government and the financial insti-
tution have a role in the collection of debts. The financial institution 
undertakes all functions associated with the loan, save the legal action or 
placement with a collection agency. Should such actions be deemed nec-
essary, the institution would first be required to report the details of the 
delinquent payments to the appropriate government agency. The govern-
ment agency would have three roles in the event of delinquency: to ver-
ify the relevant information (address, employer and income of the 
graduate from current tax records); to decide upon action to be taken; 
and to inform the financial institution as appropriate. 
There is a wide range of potential actions in the event of payment 
delinquency. For example: 
No action — defaults on loan payment may be income 
related. Sickness, child bearing and temporary bouts of unem-
ployment would not alone be cause for action. Indeed, in 
these cases, no special report would be required from the 
lender and interest would continue to accrue. In cases where 
the lender does not know the location or status of the gradu-
ate, the government could provide the graduate's address and 
send a letter to the graduate indicating that a meeting with the 
financial institution is expected. 
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Direct intervention — financial counselling by the lending 
institution or a note on the credit fde of the borrower might be 
sufficient to reestablish loan payments. In extreme cases, the 
government might consider action to garnishee an appropriate 
amount from earned income. 
Establish a lien — while deduction at source is a last resort 
for domestic loan holders, it cannot be used on non-Canadian 
incomes. For graduates living in foreign countries, the finan-
cial institution, at the request of the government agency, could 
be permitted to establish a lien on any Canadian property of 
the graduate. Other possible actions include refusal to renew 
passports as suggested by Kesselman (1993). 
Allowing some role for the public sector in loan collection does not 
preclude directives to the financial institutions that all legal means of 
collection must be attempted. Rather, such a role provides a degree of 
flexibility which may be of value in overcoming the short run financial 
problems related to unforeseen expenditures or poor financial manage-
ment on the part of graduates. 
Loan repayments. Students would receive loans to cover tuition, 
living expenses and course materials during each term of attendance at a 
PSE institution. These loans would accumulate interest on a normal 
commercial basis with repayment normally beginning some time after 
graduation. The first year of repayment would occur when the graduate 
earns a sufficient amount (based on total income) to qualify for pay-
ments and the maximum duration of repayment could extend for, say, 
thirty years. 
The maximum annual repayment required would be equal to 35% of 
the difference between after tax expected income (which includes the tax 
deductibility of the payments) and after tax minimum wage income. (We 
label this as the "the 35% rule".)5 At lower incomes, payments might not 
cover the interest costs and thus the accrued amount owing would 
increase. Over time, as income increases, payments would be expected to 
cover both interest and principal. In the majority of cases, income would 
be sufficiently high to repay the loan in less than 30 years. Payments less 
than 35% would be permissible subject to the condition that the payment 
amount be sufficient to discharge the loan completely within 30 years. 
Finally, there would be no maximum allowable repayment schedule. That 
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is, graduates wishing to repay their loans on some accelerated schedule 
would be free to do so. 
The total costs of an eight month academic year at an Ontario 
University were approximately $7,665 in 1989/90 with tuition fees 
accounting for about $1,300.6 Living expenses are a serious income related 
impediment to access for many students. The argument in favour of loan 
eligibility for living expenses is that they constitute "set up" or installation 
costs of the human capital. Eligibility under the current loan programs is 
based on the financial status of a third party (normally the parents of the 
student) or the age of the student. These are intended to respond to a per-
ceived need and the view that the public should not pay for those who can 
afford to pay themselves. Under a PP, living expenses are a (tax 
deductible) part of the capital investment, which is to be repaid in full. 
Although the general living costs would differ somewhat among 
institutions, we allow $5,500 per year for these expenses in 1990 and use 
a CPI adjustment to obtain the costs in previous years. In principal, PP 
loans could be based upon the fees for residency with meals at the uni-
versity attended together with due allowance for books, transportation, 
and miscellaneous expenses. 
Feasibility 
Structure of the PP. The appropriate university budget for analysing 
the full fee structure for students is generally considered to be the operat-
ing budget. Operating budgets are typically about 68% of the total univer-
sity budgets in Ontario.7 Not included in these operating budgets are the 
costs associated with lectures, courses and other activities for which acad-
emic credits for degrees are not granted, the costs associated with ancillary 
enterprises which typically run on a fee-for-service basis and any costs 
associated with sponsored research and trust and endowment expenditures. 
Full fees, in principle, should be the marginal cost of an additional 
student in a particular programme. In practice, full fees are based on the 
average variable costs of the university's teaching function (which 
includes salaries and wages and hence some direct research costs). The 
operating budget is taken to be total variable cost. Full fees have been 
estimated by the Ontario Ministry of Colleges and Universities and are 
reported in Stager (1989; Table 3.2, p. 32) for five degree groups. Table 1 
shows those fees and also our allocation of the various degree types in 
the Survey of 1990 Graduates to the five broader categories. 
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Table 1 
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Source: Stager (1989), Table 3.2, p. 32 
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These full tuition fees are open to discussion. In particular, a number 
of items in the operating budget are intended primarily to satisfy a per-
ceived social need other than direct research or instruction for degree or 
certificate credits. In addition, the extent to which tuition fees ought to 
finance faculty research is an open and potentially contentious issue. 
While basic research is generally considered to be a public good imply-
ing funding from the public sector, it also contributes to the quality of 
instruction. Such issues are beyond the scope of this study, but their 
analysis might well reduce the measure of full fees used here. The fig-
ures in Table 1 (1989-90 dollars) are adjusted by the CPI to obtain fees 
in earlier years and for 1990-91. These are considered to be upper 
bounds on the actual full fees.8 
Students are assumed to borrow the value of full tuition fees and liv-
ing expenses for each year of their program. A further 1% of these costs 
is added to represent the cost of life and disability insurance on the 
loans. The loans accrue interest throughout the program at the prime rate 
of interest. An additional two years of interest compounding is allowed 
to occur after graduation so as to be comparable to the earnings reported 
in the Survey of 1990 Graduates. (Under the PP, loan repayments would 
begin when the graduate earns sufficient income.) The current values of 
the ICR loans of each degree type as of 1992 for 1990 graduates are 
reported in Table 2. 
In the base case, the flow of maximum required payments is 
premised on the 35% rule and a 30 year payment horizon. Under this 
payment rule, graduates begin payments when their after tax incomes are 
greater than the after tax earnings of a full time minimum wage earner.9 
The minimum wage is assumed to grow at a real rate of 1% per year. 
Both tuition and living expense loans are treated as investments in 
human capital for tax purposes.10 
Income projections are crucial to the analysis of the loan plan but 
predictions of this sort are fraught with problems. We approach the issue 
from two directions. The first approach uses the incomes reported by 
graduates in the Statistics Canada Survey of 1990 Graduates and makes 
assumptions on the growth paths of those incomes. The second approach 
uses the earned income deciles by age (ages 24 to 53) from the 1986 
Census reported by Stager and Derkach (1992). While both approaches 
use real earned incomes for all calculations, the PP would use total 
incomes for repayment calculations. 
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Table 2 
Loan Principals of 1990 Graduates in 1992 
Degree Group Duration of 
Degree (yrs) 
Accrued Loan 
($ - 1992) 
1 3 42,462 
4 58,271 
5 75,033 
2 3 50,272 
4 68,991 
5 88,833 
3 3 58,083 
4 79,712 
5 102,634 




Source: Table 1 and calculations by authors 
Notes: 
1. Tuition (1988-89, Table 1) and living expenses ($5,500 in 1989-90) are CPI 
adjusted for the years 1985-90. Loans include a further 1% for insurance and are 
compounded annually at the then existing prime rate (annual averages) until 1992. 
2. The Survey does not differentiate between Medical Degrees and Health Science 
Degrees. Graduates in this group are assumed to experience the same aggregate 
default rate as other groups combined. 
3. The average loan value weights each type of loan by the respective number of graduates. 
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The Survey of 1990 Graduates asked graduates to report their last 
week's earnings and the annual earnings if that jobs had continued for 
one year. Thus the part-time or temporary nature of that job is included 
in the reported annual earnings. Respondents reporting earnings of less 
than $25,000 were placed in income classes of: [ < $15,000]; [$15,000 -
$17,000]; . . . ;[$23,000 - $25,000], Incomes assigned to individuals in 
these classes were the class midpoints and $15,000 for those reporting 
less than this figure. Those reporting themselves as unemployed, and 
hence not reporting any earnings at the time of the survey, are assumed 
to be able to find employment, given the low unemployment rates for 
graduates (Report of the Advisory Council on Adjustment, 1989, p 30), 
starting at $15,000. The lower bound of $15,000 is approximately 
$2,000 higher than full time minimum wages earners would receive 
annually. Those who were employed but did not report earnings and 
those who were in the Health and Medical Profession degrees were 
assumed to have the same default rate as the aggregate of employed 
(reporting earnings) and unemployed together." 
Gender-based earnings differentials are very small in the Survey but 
it is the female participation rate which complicates the earnings projec-
tions. The female participation rate is approaching that of males for the 
university educated. The participation rate for university-educated 
females aged between 25-44 was 88% in 1994 (Butlin, 1995). "In 1994, 
77% of female university graduates versus 82% of male graduates were 
in the paid workforce" (Statistics Canada, 1995). The most recent gener-
ation has a participation rate much higher than their predecessor. Should 
this continue, the gap in participation rates between the sexes may be 
eliminated. (The type of participation as between part-time and full-time 
work, however, may continue to differ.) To capture the possible effects 
of family formation on earnings paths we assume relatively flat earnings 
growth rates in the first number of years after graduation. Real earnings 
are assumed to grow at 7% per year for the first four years, at 5.5% for 
the next four years, at 3.5% for the next 12 years and 1.5% thereafter. 
The respective 1990 growth rates of mean earnings for Arts and Science 
male graduates are calculated to be 9.5%, 8.6%, 3.5% and 1.2% (Stager 
& Derkach, 1992, p. 36). The smaller assumed growth rates in the earlier 
periods are attached to both male and female incomes and thus reflect an 
implicit assumption of a more equal sharing of participation effects of 
family formation. 
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Figure 1 shows the relationship between the lowest earnings profiles 
(earnings starting at $15,000, $16,000, and $18,000) and the mean male 
high school earnings profile. One effect of the earnings and growth 
assumptions is that 25% of the sample would have a present value of 
earnings less than that of a male high school graduate. 
Default rates (the value of loans not repaid expressed as a proportion 
of total loan value) and dollar values of default are calculated for real 
interest rates of 4.5%, 6% and 7.5% with repayment periods of either 25 
or 30 years. The results for this approach to income projections are 
reported in Table 3a. The default cost of establishing the capital market 
for students loans would be approximately $500 million at current real 
interest rates of about 5%. The dollar value of default is about 7% of the 
total value of loans. 
The second approach ( the Census approach) to earnings projections 
is to use census data on earnings by age. The data used in this study are 
taken from Stager and Derkach (1992, Tables A9 & A10, hereafter the 
S&D tables). Earnings for Ontario residents from the 1986 Census were 
adjusted to reflect 1990 earnings by Stager and Derkach and have been 
further adjusted to 1992 earnings for this study.12 These tables give, 
respectively, the male and female median employment incomes, by 
deciles, for Arts and Science graduates from ages 21 through 58. 
Earnings data for those aged between 24 and 53 are used for the 30 year 
repayment calculations that follow. The data take into account those per-
sons who did not work and thus incorporate participation rates that 
existed in 1986. 
The use of cross-sectional data to estimate lifetime income tends to 
under-estimate individuals' true lifetime incomes. Those who experience 
periodic unemployment because of further study, illness, family respon-
sibilities or job shifting, and those whose income is only partially in the 
form of wages and salaries would rank in the lower deciles of earned 
income for only a small part of their working lives. One solution to this 
problem is to adjust the rate of growth of earnings.13 A second, and more 
serious problem in the present context, is that the participation rate for 
female graduates has grown since 1986 and this will have considerable 
effect over the 30 age cohorts to be brought into a newly started PP. 
Thus the tables used for female earnings, representing participation 
choices and earnings of 30 previous graduating cohorts are likely to seri-
ously under-estimate earnings paths for the 1990 graduating cohort in 
their 30 year repayment period. 
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Low Earnings Profiles 
Mean male high school earnings are taken from Stager and Derkach (1992, Table A3) and adjusted to 
1992. Earnings profiles for the Survey approach have initial earnings grow at 7.0% for four years, 5.5% 
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Table 3a 
Default Summary by Survey Approach 
Repayment Real Rate Graduate Default in Default 
Period of Interest Group Billions $-1992 Rate % 
25 years 7.5% Employed 0.46 9.54 
Unemployed 0.37 59.68 
Omitted 0.24 15.38 
Aggregate 1.08 15.38 
6.0% Employed 0.34 7.05 
Unemployed 0.32 52.04 
Omitted 0.19 12.17 
Aggregate 0.85 12.17 
4.5% Employed 0.22 4.47 
Unemployed 0.26 41.31 
Omitted 0.14 8.66 
Aggregate 0.61 8.66 
30 years 7.5% Employed 0.38 7.85 
Unemployed 0.34 54.82 
Omitted 0.21 13.16 
Aggregate 0.92 13.16 
6.0% Employed 0.22 4.47 
Unemployed 0.26 41.31 
Omitted 0.14 8.66 
Aggregate 0.61 8.66 
4.5% Employed 0.12 2.54 
Unemployed 0.18 29.44 
Omitted 0.09 5.59 
Aggregate 0.39 5.59 
Notes: 1. Earnings paths of graduates are constructed from reported earnings in 1992 
from the Survey of 1990 Graduates. Earnings start at $15,000 (for those reporting less 
than $15,000), at $16,000 (reported earnings $15,000-$ 17,000), at $18,000, $20,000, 
$22,000, and $24,000 respectively for subsequent $2,000 ranges. Earnings are then 
assumed to grow at 7% per year for four years, 5.5% for the next four years, 3.5% for 
the next 12 years, and 1.5% thereafter. Default is calculated as the difference between 
the present value of potential repayments of the earnings streams and the cost of the 
degree by type and duration for each graduate. 
2, The Employed were graduates who reported employment and earnings. The 
Unemployed were assigned initial earnings of $15,000. The Omitted group includes 
those reporting no earnings and the Medical and Health Degree graduates which are 
assigned the average default rate of the other two groups. 
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Table 3b 
Default Summary by Census Approach 
Repayment Period of 30 years 
Default Rate in % 
Real Rate Males Females 
of Interest (S&D) (S&D) (1.7 births) (1.2 births) 
4.5% 15.45 44.14 18.05 16.18 
6.0% 16.57 45.21 21.16 19.31 
7.5% 19.53 48.17 25.51 23.24 
Combined Average Default Rate 
(S&D) (1.7 births) (1.2 births) 
4.5% 31.51 16.91 15.86 
6.0% 32.61 19.14 18.11 
7.5% 35.57 22.88 21.61 
Notes: 1. S&D, Stager and Derkach (1992) Tables A9 and A10 report Ontario male and 
female graduates' earnings in $1990 by age 21 to 58 years old in deciles. These earn-
ings are increased by 9.7% to reflect projected 1992 earnings (Canism D747018, non-
cola, all industry wage increases). Each earnings decile (age 24 to 53 years) is treated 
as an earnings path from which the present value of potential repayments is calculated. 
2, Simulated earnings paths for females use the male deciles as default paths and an 
average of 1.7 or 1.2 births per female. A birth implies three years out of the labour 
force and no earnings. Probabilities of births are ad hoc and are given by the following 
schedule: 
Age: 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 
1.2 births 6 6 7 7 8 10 10 10 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
1.7 births 8 8 9 10 10 12 12 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
3. The default rate is calculated for each male and female earnings decile given an 
average degree cost of $66,128. The default rates for all male and all females is the 
average over all deciles for that group. 
4. The combined average default rate uses the 1990 proportions of .44 and .56 for 
males and females respectively. (Education in Canada, 1992-1993, Table 37) 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXVIII, No. 1, 1998 
58 L.C. McDonough & R.E. Wright 
The changing female participation rate and its potential effects on 
earnings are addressed as follows. In addition to examining the earnings 
decile data for females we simulate earnings flows for females which are 
based upon the decile data for males. Our approach is to attribute lower 
participation rates to females as a result of childbirth. The fertility rate 
for Canada was 1.52 in 1987, rose to 1.7 in 1990, and remained at that 
figure through 1993 (Statistics Canada, 1995b, p. 7). While there is some 
evidence of countercyclical movements in fertility rates (Hyatt & Milne, 
1991), other studies suggest that participation rates for females is likely 
to continue to decrease.14 We construct earnings paths based upon 1.7 
and 1.2 births per female. The characteristics of female university gradu-
ates, education, age when first child is born, and earnings, are those 
associated with lower fertility rates.15 
Earnings paths are constructed assuming that, in the absence of chil-
dren the female age-earnings decile table would replicate the S&D male 
age-earnings decile table. Thus each male decile earnings path is treated 
as the earnings path for females who have no children. In each year, 
women between the age of 24 and 41 have a given probability of having 
a child such that the average number of children over the period is 1.2 or 
1.7. (The probabilities are adhoc and are reported in Table 3b.) A birth is 
assumed to result in three years out of the labour force.16 When the fertil-
ity rate is 1.2 and the period out of the labour force is three years, the 
participation rate is approximately 10% less than that of males over the 
30 year repayment period. Earnings on re-joining the labour force is at 
the rate which was earned in the last full year of work. 
Since the decile data are not matched to degree groups, we use a 
weighted average (by course type, duration, and number of graduates) of 
the cost of a degree from the Survey . After interest compounding and 
insurance this cost was $65,473 in $1992 . The simulations generate 
earnings flows and repayment capacities for females under the 35%/30 
year repayment rule. The repayment capacities are sorted by size and the 
median value of each decile is taken to represent the repayment made for 
that decile. The default rate for each decile is one minus the repayment 
capacity to cost ratio. The aggregate default rate sums the default rates 
over each of the deciles and is calculated for both males and females. 
Default rates for the Census approach are reported in Table 3b. 
Default rates and repayment burdens. The default rates are based 
upon all students borrowing the maximum eligible amount. The calculated 
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default rates are used to calculate the dollar values of default. The total 
cost to the public sector includes the forgone tax revenues (tax expendi-
ture) due to the deductibility provisions of loan repayments.17 This tax 
allowance is found to be approximately 35% of the value of loans which 
are repaid. Those with starting incomes above $30,000, approximately the 
median income in the Survey, would repay their loans entirely. From the 
last column in Table 4a, those with starting incomes of $30,000, have an 
after-tax share between 62% and 69% of their loans but have no defaults. 
The difference between the repayment share and 100% is the value of the 
tax deductibility provisions for those with no defaults. Those with higher 
incomes have been calculated to repay 60% of loans. Thus the value of the 
tax deductions for half of the students is higher than 35% of the loan 
value. Those with lesser incomes have some value of default and lesser 
values of tax deductibility. 
The approximate relationship between default rates and the total cost 
to the public of the loan plan are shown in Figure 2. If d is the default 
rate and TLV is total loan value, then the tax expenditure of the plan is 
given by TE = 0.327(l-d)TLV. The total cost of the PP is approximately 
TE + dTLV. The federal and provincial shares of the tax expenditure are 
roughly 65% and 35% respectively. 
The repayment burden for graduates under the PP is defined as the 
difference between after-tax earnings calculated with the loan payments 
and after-tax earnings without the student loan payments expressed as a 
proportion of gross earnings. For lower income earners, those whose 
payments are at the maximum required rate throughout the repayment 
period, the burden is approximately 9% to 12%. The burdens have been 
calculated for the lowest earnings paths from the Survey approach and 
are shown in Figure 3. One can interpret these burdens as the maximum 
repayment tax rate on gross earnings implied by the repayment scheme. 
For graduates who must pay at the maximum rate, the repayment 
burdens are independent of the size of the loans to be repaid, the interest 
rate, and the payback period. The burden would increase with decreases 
in the basic exemption level of earnings (the after-tax minimum wage 
was an arbitrary choice) or by an increase in the proportion of eligible 
earnings required for repayment. Changing the 35% repayment rule by 
(+/-) 5% would change the repayment burdens by approximately (+/-) 
1.5% and the dollar value of default by approximately (-/+) $0.2 billion. 
The higher the repayment burden, the lower will be the default value. A 
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Burden of Repayment for Graduates 
Burden is defined as the after tax value of repayment as a proportion of gross earnings. 
A. Burden based on male graduate earnings in the third decile. 
B. Burden based on the Survey approach earnings path with initial earnings of $15,000. 
C. Burden based on the Survey approach earnings path with initial earnings of $18,000. 
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39%/25 year rule has the same dollar value of default as does the 
35%/30 year rule. There are clearly trade-offs in the design of the repay-
ment structure. The 35% /30 year structure permits the burden to be less 
than 10% per year for half of the repayment period for the lowest 
income earners and generally less than 12% per year for others. 
The repayment burden on lower income graduates is little affected 
by a reduction in allowable loans. In particular, if students were not per-
mitted to borrow against living expenses, the calculated cost of default 
would fall substantially, but the burden to the lowest income group 
would remain at 9% to 11.5% over the last half of the repayment period 
simply because they would still be repaying at the maximum rate. 
Although graduate degree programs have not been analysed, schol-
arships and employment as teaching or research assistants could reduce 
considerably the value of additional loans required. Moreover, with start-
ing incomes in excess of $30,000, the individual with a graduate degree 
has the capacity to discharge a loan in excess of $100,000. Involuntary 
defaults from this group can be expected to be small. 
Extending the PP to PSE institutions other than universities would 
seem to be financially feasible. Assuming the income path which starts 
at $15,000 and a real interest rate of 7.5%, $34,400 of student loans 
could be repaid. This is approximately 80% of the total costs involved in 
a three-year general degree program. The majority of non-degree PSE 
programs are less than three years in length and the incomes of graduates 
are, on average, greater than the mean of male high school graduates. A 
direct empirical study of this sector might well suggest a repayment bur-
den of less than 10%. 
Student and public sector shares. A different perspective on the 
costs of the PP can be presented by comparing the shares under three 
different options: the current arrangement, the current arrangement with 
the student share of fees increased to 50%, and, the PP. Tables 4a and 
4b show both the student shares as well as the public sector share under 
these three options. Student shares under the current 25% fee structure 
or a 50% fee structure include both the payable fees and living 
expenses. (Full fees here are as defined in Table 1.) These figures over-
estimate the student share to the extent that current subsidies and tax 
expenditures are not included. Unlike the PP, these shares are not 
income dependent. Shares under the PP are relatively less for lower 
income graduates due to the default subsidy. Shares for higher income 
graduates are less than unity because of the tax deductibility provisions 
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Table 4a 
Student and Public Sector Shares of Total PSE Costs - Student Shares 
Current Structure 
Living costs plus 
After Tax Shares 
Survey Approach, Initial Earnings 
Degree Duration 25% Fee 50% Fee $15,000 $20,000 $25,000 $30,000 
Group 1 3 0.48 0.62 0.58 0.72 0.75 0.69 
4 0.48 0.62 0.43 0.70 0.69 0.67 
5 0.48 0.62 0.33 0.53 0.66 0.66 
Group 2 3 0.43 0.58 0.43 0.70 0.71 0.69 
4 0.43 0.58 0.36 0.58 0.67 0.67 
5 0.43 0.58 0.28 0.45 0.61 0.63 
Group 3 3 0.38 0.54 0.42 0.68 0.70 0.68 
4 0.38 0.54 0.31 0.51 0.65 0.65 
5 0.38 0.54 0.24 0.39 0.53 0.62 
Group 4 3 0.38 0.54 0.42 0.68 0.70 0.68 
4 0.38 0.54 0.31 0.50 0.66 0.65 
5 0.37 0.52 0.23 0.39 0.52 0.62 
Notes: 1. Total costs include living expenses and tuition. Student shares in the Survey 
Approach are based on a 7.5% real interest rate and 35% - 30 year repayment rule. 
2. Student shares under current funding include 25% or 50% of full fees but deducts 
Canada Student Loan subsidies and tax deductions, a total of $1 billion (HRDC, 1994, 
Table 1). Student shares under the PP are calculated on an after tax basis. 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXVIII, No. 1,1998 
64 L.C. McDonough & R.E. Wright 
Table 4b 
Student and Public Sector Shares of Total PSE Costs -





Census Approach Current Funding 
S&D 1.7 births 1.2 births 25% fees 50% fees 
4.5% 36.5 54.1 44.1 43.4 59.8 44.7 
6.0% 38.5 54.8 45.6 44.9 
7.5% 41.6 56.8 48.1 47.3 
Notes: 1. The public sector share under current funding includes the student loan subsidies 
in the Canada Student Loans Program as well as tax benefits mentioned in Table 4a, 
note 2. 
2. Public Sector Share of Total Costs is the sum of the default rate (Table 3b) and the 
reduction in tax revenues to the public sector from the tax deductability provisions of 
the PP. This tax loss is approximated by 32.7% of the proportion of loan repaid which 
is (1-default rate). The tax loss factor of 32.7% is based on direct calculation using the 
Survey Approach with real interest rates of 7.5%. 
of the PP. Note in particular, that these shares are not much greater than 
those for students under the 50% fee plan. 
In calculating the public sector shares, allowance has been made for 
the subsidies to students under the Canada Student Loans Program 
(CSLP) as well as tax expenditures which we assume constant ($1 bil-
lion) under both 25% and 50% fee structure. The cost to the public sec-
tor for the PP includes both the expected value of defaults as well as the 
tax expenditures with the deductibility provisions. 
The public sector shares under the 25% and 50% fee structures are 
58% and 43%. Should both male and f emale income s t reams be 
unchanged from Stager and Derkach's income deciles, the public sector 
share would be 60% under a PP. This share is reduced to 48% under the 
simulation with 1.2 births per female. To the extent that the income paths 
generated form the Survey of 1990 Graduates provide a useful projection 
of income paths, the public share of PSE expenditures is 41%. The range 
of share estimates under the PP is approximately the same as the current 
funding system with payable fee in the 25% to 50% range. Our expecta-
tion is that the raw S&D data represent a considerable understatement of 
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the potential income paths of both males and females. The 1.2 births per 
female approach approximates an 88% participation rate, but incomes in 
this approach (based on male decile figures for 1990) can be expected to 
underestimate the income flows. The Survey-Income approach assumes 
high and constant participation rates but assigns relatively low incomes to 
the bottom third of graduates as compensation. We would suggest that a 
public share of 41% to 48% of PSE costs would be a reasonable estimate. 
Design Issues 
While the details of the proposed PP have been made explicit, a number 
of broader issues regarding the conceptual design of the program are 
implicit. The three major issues discussed in this section are whether an 
ICR should be self-financing or subsidized as in the PP, the role of the 
public and private sectors and the extent to which introduction of a PP 
involves an intergenerational transfer of the burden for financing PSE. 
The Self-financing ICR, Equity versus Debt 
If an ICR is to be a self financing loan system, then those earning 
higher incomes would pay for their own loans as well as the defaults or 
under-payments incurred by lower income graduates. Subsidization of 
defaul ts by the general taxpayer, as in the proposed PP, would be 
replaced by cross-subsidization among graduates. However, an alterna-
tive view of a self-financing ICR is that the public sector makes an 
equity investment in the students' education (human capital) and that 
repayments are the dividend payments on the invested equity. In this 
model, dividend payments are linked to income with higher income 
graduates naturally generating more dividends. While an interesting 
application of risk spreading, an important problem in the application to 
PSE is that the projects (students) over which the public sector invest-
ment is made do not produce independent income (dividend) streams. 
Those with lower dividend payouts relative to their equity cause others 
to have higher dividend payouts. We presume that dividends repaid 
would be proportionally related to the loan (equity) amounts but repay-
ments by the "better o f f ' would also pay for the default of others. Large 
portions of students who perceive themselves as having good income 
prospects (better averages in the upper years of study or easier access to 
the job market) or those with greater abilities to self finance, would be 
expected to minimize their loans and thus minimize the amount of 
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dividends to be paid over and above the value of their personal loan. 
The self selection would reduce the number of potentially high dividend 
graduates, increase the burden on those remaining and have negative 
consequences for equality of access. 
The obvious solution to this problem would be to require all students 
to partake of the ICR; that is, there could be no opting out.'8 Such an ICR 
would then be very much like the private loan market with "dividend 
rates" equivalent to risk adjusted market rates. That an extensive private 
market does not exist for student loans is consistent with the requirement 
that a self-financing ICR be coercive in requiring the participation of all 
students. A self-financing ICR for all PSE students does not involve a 
public sector solution to the uncertainty problem. Rather it forces a pri-
vate sector solution on to unwilling participants. 
Under the PP, the default subsidy is the cost of creating the condi-
tions necessary for the emergence of a capital market. The benefits of 
this market include the increase in accessibility to PSE, particularly to 
those students in poorer financial circumstances. Canada currently "pro-
vides nearly $1 billion in [education] aid each year" through the Canada 
Student Loans Program alone.19 This is the current amount that the fed-
eral government is willing to allocate to enhance financial accessibility. 
The cost of the defaults under the PP from Table 3a is approximately this 
amount, but it purchases a mechanism which has the potential to elimi-
nate financial accessibility problems. 
The Public Sector Role 
An ICR typically defines at least two roles for the public sector, a collec-
tion role and a financing role. The financing role has been discussed 
above. The collection role includes, at a minimum, the requirement that 
the public sector be able to follow the graduate through tax records. 
Indeed, the argument that the public sector use the tax system for collec-
tion purposes is premised on objectives of simplicity and efficiency. 
Ideally, the repayment rule would be very simple, for example, repay 
x% of income. Collection through the tax system would be simple only 
to the extent that repayment followed the simple rule. The fundamental 
objective of an ICR is repayment flexibility based on income. Collection 
by tax authorities implies that account balances be kept for all students. 
This is neither trivial nor costless. It requires construction and mainte-
nance of a large scale database which would be peripherally related to 
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the functions of the tax authorities rather than an integral part of the 
existing tax accounting mechanisms. 
Over time, changes in fee structures, enrollments and interest rates 
can be expected to occur which may require changes in the simple 
repayment rules. Either tax rates must change for everyone or for partic-
ular sets of individuals. The former case implies intergenerational cross-
subsidization as well as a unilateral (government sponsored) change to 
payments not foreseen as part of the arrangement. In the latter case, the 
tax mechanism becomes a considerably more complicated vehicle.20 
The tax system is not well suited to treat like incomes differently. A 
given income stream could repay a given loan in fifteen years, and a 
graduate with this income would not be able to extend payments over 
twenty-five years or to reduce the period to ten years. The term structure 
of the loans is essentially out of the graduates' control. Allowing for 
repayment flexibility, payments above the rule and payments below the 
rule, requires the maintenance of financial records for each individual on 
an ongoing basis. 
The variety of loans, income flows, temporary default of payments, 
PSE programs, and changes over time argue for a flexible ICR plan. The 
infrastructure required to handle such problems on an individual basis 
already exists in the Canadian Financial Sector and has a well known 
cost structure, market interest rates. 
The public sector plays an important informational role in that it 
must be able to forward income related and location information to the 
private sector institutions. Current private sector collection of student 
loans is made difficult primarily because graduates experience short 
term financial difficulties or because graduates do not inform the collect-
ing institution of their location. To a large extent, many of these prob-
lems can be alleviated under the PP by simple information flows from 
the public to private sector. 
Intergenerational Transfer of the Burden 
There are a number of complications that arise in assessing the intergen-
erational transfer of the PSE burden to graduates under the PP. The bur-
den transferred to the new generation is considerably less on a per 
graduate basis than that incurred by a new generation graduate financed 
under the PP for two reasons. First, all non PSE beneficiaries subsidize 
the PSE users in the current scheme; and second, the public sector portion 
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of PSE covers only a portion of fees and living expenses. Previous gener-
ations have paid for much of their total costs while they were students. 
One view of an intergenerationally fair transition would be that cur-
rent generation taxpayers continue to pay for the PSE expenditures made 
to date and new graduates pay only their own expenditures. Total PSE 
expenditures are approximately $16 billion and total incomes (wages, 
salaries, supplemental income, and corporate income before taxes) are 
about $424 billion. The average aggregate tax rate for PSE is thus about 
3.77% of direct gross income revenues (1992 figures). Thus if the cur-
rent generation of taxpayers were to continue paying this average 3.77% 
tax, they would reduce the average rate to 0% over 30 years and repay 
the current scheme obligations. All taxpayers, not just new PP graduates 
share in the burden transferred.21 
Incentives 
Distinct from access and financing, the usual argument for an ICR system 
together with a differentiated fee system has been to give incentives to 
both students and institutions to be cost and quality conscious. These 
incentives will be specific to the details of any ICR and warrant attention. 
Most PSE graduates are clearly worse off in a move to the PP, as 
they are under increasing fees with the current financing system. The 
increase in the (real or perceived) price to students moving to the PP 
might be expected to reduce demand for PSE. The optimal quantity of 
PSE will be purchased when the expected risk adjusted rate of return on 
the investment is equal to prevailing market rates. To the extent that PSE 
investment has higher than normal returns, pure economic rent is earned. 
With no barriers to access, rent seeking would tend to increase PSE 
investment. Access to investment financing is guaranteed at relatively 
low rates and defaults are not borne directly by the investor. PSE thus 
remains a lucrative investment opportunity. While students may be justi-
fied in decrying higher real costs under the PP, investment in PSE would 
still be the best long term financial opportunity for most. Moreover, 
accessibility need not be constrained by financial considerations and 
those not formerly able even to contemplate PSE could enter the arena. 
Particular PSE programs with expected returns less than the market 
return would be expected to contract. If subsidization is considered, the 
preferred public sector choice may be the subsidization of measures 
aimed at improving such things as quality and delivery of PSE services 
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as a means to improving the incomes of graduates through, for example, 
equipment or capital purchases, re-engineering of courses or curricula, 
or research sponsorship. The alternative, fee subsidization, reduces the 
cost of investment to the student rather than increasing the income 
prospects and involves, typically, a more permanent commitment by the 
public sector and engenders a less efficient use of resources. 
Under current PSE funding, many students have strong incentives to 
undertake part-time work, to work full-time before undertaking PSE, or 
to interrupt full-time study with full-time work. Families also make sac-
rifices to help with PSE financing. While the necessity of work and fam-
ily financing is reduced considerably with the PP, traditional methods of 
finance remain as options for reducing the loans which would otherwise 
be required. 
The incentive effects on family formation, and in particular female 
choices regarding work force participation, may be undesirable. The 
central issue is not the potential value of loan defaults for this group, but 
rather the increased burden of repayment directly attributable to family 
responsibilities. Interest compounding continues and the outstanding 
principal increases while the individual is out of the labour force. The 
increased burden and the incentives to reduce or retard family formation 
may be considered as socially undesirable and public sector intervention 
may be warranted. Such an intervention might take the form of interest 
forgiveness for either of the parents for some period, say three years per 
child. While this is a rather blunt instrument, it is simple and allows the 
parents to choose, if applicable, which loan to modify. Moreover, it is 
not dependent upon the work force participation of either parent. 
There has been concern that the incentive mechanism under ICR's in 
general would encourage programs to be more closely focused on the 
labour market. The PP is clearly a market oriented mechanism. That all 
university degrees do not lead to directly related jobs has always been 
the case. The PP gives incentives to Universities to establish links with 
Community Colleges or other PSE institutions in order to provide perti-
nent information and possibly courses outside of the degree program. 
There may be no particular need to change the content of a general Arts 
or Science program. But such programs may have a competitive advan-
tage in attracting students by making available access to more practical 
and labour market oriented courses. The PP would allow students to take 
academic courses and labour market relevant courses. 
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The incentives for PSE institutions and students are broader than the 
cost/quality discussion typically implies since both players must be con-
cerned about future employment and educational opportunities. The 
Economic Council of Canada (1992) stressed the importance of the 
"Learning Continuum", the relationships among educational institutions 
and the need for periodic upgrading. It concludes that there is a "lack of 
clear pathways, linkages, and accreditation between these various ele-
ments of the continuum" (p. 17). The concern over employment and 
labour force evolution, together with competition for students, may con-
stitute the required incentives to coordinate and collaborate among the 
different types of PSE institutions. Such incentives are consistent with a 
"coherent learning system" so strongly advocated by the Council. 
Summary 
It would seem to be highly probable that some form of an ICR, or per-
haps multiple plans will be introduced together with higher fees for stu-
dents undertaking PSE. A particular form of an ICR has been designed 
and analysed. The proposal is based on treating the investment in human 
capital equivalently to an investment in physical capital for tax purposes. 
To allow the functioning of the private markets in the financing of PSE, 
the public sector must guarantee the loans and provide an information 
service to the private sector. This proposal encompasses loans covering 
full tuition fees and living expenses and repayments geared to income 
and thus increases accessibility to PSE by all potential students. The pri-
vate sector would be responsible for the issuance, administration and 
collection of payments with some public sector aid in the collection role. 
An empirical analysis applied to the first undergraduate and profes-
sional degree obtained by 1990 graduates results in maximum repayment 
burdens of 10% to 12% of gross incomes for those earning the lowest 
incomes. The students' and government's shares of the total costs under 
a PP would be approximately in the same range as the 25% to 50% 
tuition fees under current financing arrangements. Assuming continued 
high participation rates of graduates and modest growth rates of income 
leads to a total cost to the public less than the current financing system 
with students paying 50% of full fees. A more conservative estimate 
using 1986 Census data for males and adopting a 1.2 birth per female 
assumption for females leads to a public sector cost equivalent to the 
current system with students paying 42% of full fees. From a direct cost 
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point of view neither the public sector nor students would be made 
worse off by a move to the PP. 
Unmeasured benefits of the PP include an incentive structure which 
promotes the efficient production and delivery of PSE services as well as 
further cooperation and integration of PSE services among different 
institutions. The PP achieves the goal of accessibility for all qualified 
students regardless of income and ensures that concerns about income 
maintenance do not detract from academic performance. 
Implementation of the PP is conceptually straightforward. Both lev-
els of government must agree to the tax deductibility of PSE loan repay-
ments and the default cost of the loans can be allocated among Provinces 
in proportion to loans made to students attending PSE institutions in that 
province. This need not imply that Provinces bear the full cost of 
defaults. The cash and tax transfer components of the Canadian Health 
and Social Transfer could be adjusted to ensure that the current propor-
tions of Federal and Provincial funding of PSE are maintained. This 
implies a possible change in the mix of cash and tax points, rather than 
the level of funding. A more difficult issue concerns the manner in 
which the long term future outlays for default and tax expenditures are to 
be financed by early period PSE savings. To the extent that adopting the 
PP is approximately revenue neutral to the public sector, further exami-
nation of the details the cost sharing between levels of government and 
financing over the long run is warranted. 
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Notes 
' A summary of the Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
and further references can be found in Chapman (1994). 
^ West (1993) and before him the Macdonald Royal Commission (1985) 
recommended that universities be permitted to set differentiated fees. 
^ Lower quality educational services would be expected to command lower 
tuition fees. In the limit, mail-order degrees might well qualify for tuition loans, 
but repayment of such loans would also be relatively simple. On a more positive 
note, the increasing possibilities of distance learning may prove to be an access 
and quality enhancing addition to the traditional PSE institutional offerings. 
^ The portion of a loan for tuition might be automatically deposited to the 
institution in which the student is registered. This differs from the loan system 
instituted by the Queens' School of Business in which all loans pass through a 
bank designated by the School. In this case, the School backs the loans. 
^ The thirty year repayment period and the 35% rule are parameters of the 
PP. The rationale for this parameterization is discussed in the feasibility analysis. 
^ Ontario Ministry of Colleges and Universities (1989), page 2. 
^ Budget figures in this section are taken from the Financial Report of 
Ontario Universities, 1991-92. Given the dominant weight of Ontario in 
Canadian universities, we presume that these figures are good proxies for the 
Canadian average costs. 
^ Average fees could be reduced by 30% to 50% depending upon the allo-
cation of research and other costs in the operating budgets. 
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^ This contrasts with the $21,402 threshold used by Stager and Derkach 
(1992), p. 9. 
A lump sum of $9000 is also allowed as a deduction from income 
for tax purposes to account for the personal tax credit as well as other 
miscellaneous tax credits. This amount is most appropriate for income 
earners in the lowest tax bracket. 
11 The total dollar value of default is important for policy purposes. This 
treatment of these two groups would tend to over-estimate the dollar value of 
defaults. The Survey does not distinguish between Medical degrees and 
Health Science and related degrees but reported earnings were the highest of 
all groups. 
12 CANSIM series D747018, the increase in wage rates, all industries, 
non-cola is used for this adjustment. Earnings are increased by 9.7%. 
Stager and Derkach (1992), page 18 also note this problem. 
1 4 Grindstaff (1992), Hobart (1991), and Romaniuc (1991) discuss fer-
tility in Canada. Higher education levels, age of the mother at first child, 
earnings and social acceptance of female workforce participation tend to 
reduce fertility. 
Beaujot, et al. (1991) in analysing the 1984 Canadian Fertility Survey 
report that the average number of children in 1984 for women with some uni-
versity education was 0.96. 
Lefebvre (1995) and Vaillancourt (1995) both argue for pre-school pro-
grams for children starting at age three. Regulations in the formal child care 
sector differentiate between infants and toddlers based on an age of one and one 
half years. 
17 While deductibility of capital and interest expenses is not an expense to 
the government, the ICR would change the tax revenue of the government in a 
significant way and is therefore included in the analysis. 
18 Nerlove (1976) discusses the issue of opting out in very great detail and 
in the context of the Yale loan plan. Although the Yale plan is self financing, 
adverse selection is seen as a real problem, good students can go elsewhere and 
hence raise the premium. Of course, weaker students is not a problem for Yale 
and the Yale experience might not extend to all universities. 
Minister, Human Resources and Development, (1994b). 
20 Note that even a tax-based ICR would require some agency tasked with 
the collection of accounts in default. 
21 The intergenerational transfer involved takes on a greater significance 
when considered as a part of the total transfers which might be expected to 
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occur in the provision of pension and old age income security. See Courchene 
(1994) Chapter 3. In the longer run, welfare gains due to decreased taxes may 
accrue to the extent that tax expenditures are less welfare reducing than tax col-
lections. See Constantos and West (1991) for a recent evaluation of the welfare 
cost of taxation as it relates to the cost of education. 
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